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Abstract Microfinance is high on the public agenda, and better corporate gov-
ernance has been identified as a key factor for enhancing the viability of the
industry. However, recent literature on the subject struggles to identify the corporate
governance mechanisms that influence the performance of the Micro Finance
Institutions (MFIs). Guided by stakeholder and agency theories, this paper uses a
historical parallel found in savings banks to present corporate governance lessons
for MFIs, particularly non-profit MFIs, today. The findings indicate that monitoring
by bank associations, depositors, donors, and local communities was important in
securing the survival of savings banks. In addition, a willingness to expand their
mission to serve wealthier customers alongside the poor helped the banks become
financially viable. These findings could prompt a rethinking of microfinance gov-
ernance, which stresses regulation, for-profit ownership, and traditional vertical
board control. The paper argues that a broader and more stakeholder-based
understanding of corporate governance is necessary. Moreover, the paper demon-
strates that historical studies can provide governance lessons for today.
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1 Introduction
Microfinance, the supply of banking services to the poor, is high on the public
agenda and is attracting increased interest from academics. The development-
enhancing aspect of microfinance has been recently recognised with the Nobel
Peace Prize awarded to Mohammad Yunus and Grameen Bank. Microfinance is also
increasingly becoming an investment opportunity. The total stock of foreign capital
investment in microfinance more than tripled between 2004 and 2006, to
US$4 billion, with the establishment of 40 new specialised international investment
funds (Reille and Foster 2008).
A new type of firm, called a Micro Finance Institution (MFI), has become the
provider of microfinance services. A typical characteristic of an MFI is its dual
mission to serve the poor and remain financially sustainable. Most MFIs are
sponsored by donors, and incorporated as non-profit organizations or member-
owned cooperatives (Mersland 2009).
A recent report identified corporate governance as a principal risk facing
microfinance, threatening its role as both a business and a social service (CSFI
2008). However, studies by Mersland and Strøm (2009) and Hartarska (2005) find
that best practice governance mechanisms from regular firms in mature markets do
not generally have much influence on the performance of the MFIs. Thus, there is a
need for a different and more original approach to identify and better understand the
governance mechanisms that can enhance MFIs’ long-term survival. In line with the
recommendation in Mersland (2009), this paper uses a historical parallel found in
nineteenth century savings banks to identify and present corporate governance
lessons for MFIs today. To my knowledge, this type of historical study represents a
novel approach in both the microfinance and in the corporate governance literatures.
This paper outlines how non-profit MFIs and savings banks share the ownership
premise of being non-profit organizations. A non-profit organisation is influenced by
several stakeholders, but no particular group or person can legally claim ownership
or receive residual earnings from it (Hansmann 1996; Mersland 2009). Thus,
savings banks and non-profit MFIs are similar, both legally and economically. The
paper therefore argues that particularly non-profit MFIs could potentially learn
important governance lessons from the original savings banks. One challenge in the
governance of non-profit organizations is the fact that managers serving as agents
are supervised by donor organizations, who also serve as agents (Varian 1990).
Thus, traditional board governance may be less effective in non-profit MFIs
(Glaeser 2002). A broader perspective is required and attempted in this paper.
Microfinance is not a recent phenomenon. In fact, several pro-poor banking systems
preceded it. Some, like savings banks and savings and credit cooperatives, continue to
be important banking organisations throughout the world, while others, like Irish and
English loan funds, have disappeared (Hollis and Sweetman 1998). Caprio and Vittas
(1997) explain how the financial systems in developing countries today can learn from
the financial systems of Western countries in the nineteenth century.
Modern microfinance was born as a response to the frustrated development
resulting from subsidised rural credit in the 1950s and 1960s (Adams and Fitchett
1992). Thus, learning from history is inherent in its philosophy. However, the
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importance of learning from banking history is generally unexplored in the
microfinance literature, though exceptions do exist. Fa¨lting et al. (2006) drew a
parallel between the early development of the Swedish savings banks. Hollis and
Sweetman (1998) identify lessons to be learned from six different historic European
pro-poor banking systems (not the savings banks though), and these researchers
(2004) also drew parallels with the seventeenth-century Irish loan funds. Seibel
(2003) and Guinnane (2002) draw attention to how financial history demonstrates
the need for appropriate legal frameworks in the development of pro-poor financial
systems. However, no previous historical microfinance study has drawn attention to
corporate governance.
In order to identify the governance mechanisms that enabled the survival of
savings banks, this paper reviews the historical literature on the subject. The
findings indicate that bank associations, mismatches in liability/asset maturity
(deposits on demand), local communities, and donors risking their personal
reputations were important tools to discipline managers and secure the survival of
the banks. The banks operated under either a friendly regulatory regime or under no
regime at all. In the initial years, the banks did not face much competition.
However, competition gradually became a major factor in disciplining the
managers, and it is considered one of the main causes for savings banks’ continued
success in several markets today. The banks’ willingness to expand their mission by
serving poor customers alongside the more wealthy helped their financial viability.
These findings could prompt a revision in thoughts on microfinance governance,
which stresses regulation and traditional vertical board control. The lessons from the
savings banks indicate that a broader and stakeholder-based understanding of
corporate governance is necessary to secure the long-term survival of a pro-poor
banking system. Besides, the pursuit of financial objectives should be pragmatic.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explores the early history of savings
banks; Sect. 3 discusses theoretical views on microfinance governance; Sect. 4
identifies potential corporate governance mechanisms in pro-poor banking and
discusses their relevance to historic savings banks and modern non-profit MFIs;
Sect. 5 discusses previous findings in order to identify lessons for today; and Sect. 6
concludes.
2 The early history of the savings banks
To understand the birth of savings banks, one must analyse their initial context. The
ideological movement out of which savings banks were born was a search for new
initiatives to improve the living conditions of the poor (Tucker 1991; Rønning
1972). Thrift and savings were introduced as means to avoid poverty and become
rich (Tucker 1991). Therefore, the establishment of the first savings banks was a
response to a new doctrine of self-help (Horne 1947). At the same time, this doctrine
was convenient for the wealthy and the local authorities, who were able to continue
a laissez faire policy of poverty assistance (Fishlow 1961; Clemmensen 1985).
Industrialisation was another driving force behind the establishment of savings
banks. Low wage earners arriving in the cities needed a safe and convenient place to
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deposit their money. The existing commercial banks showed little interest in serving
the wage earners with savings facilities (Teck 1968). At the same time, the lack of
regulation, in combination with banks’ reputation for speculation and exploitation
of customers, made contracting with investor-owned commercial banks too risky for
poor depositors (Hansmann 1996, 1989).
The first savings banks emerged in the late eighteenth century in Europe. By the
second half of the nineteenth century, there were hundreds of banks in most
European countries, as well as in the US (Pampillon 2003; Teck 1968; Horne 1947).
The pattern was the same in all countries: banks were first established in the cities
and spread to smaller villages after some decades (Rønning 1972; Clemmensen
1985). The banks were not organised by the poor themselves, but by the upper class,
often in coordination with the local authorities and the priesthood (Rønning 1972;
Pohl 2003; Clemmensen 1985; Horne 1947). The initiators were motivated by a
combination of altruistic philanthropy and the self-interest of letting the poor help
themselves. During the initial years, the management of savings banks was typically
based on the promoters’ voluntary work. Banks were only open a few hours during
the month (Rønning 1972; Clemmensen 1985; Horne 1947), and this low-cost
operational mode made it possible for the savings banks to rapidly become
financially sustainable.
Governments actively supported the establishment of savings banks. Subsidies in
the form of sponsored earnings on public bonds, exemption on stamp duties, or
permission to charge loan interest above the legal ceiling were common. However,
they were not imperative in securing the banks’ operations, as most operations were
carried out by volunteers, and operational income covered other costs (Pampillon
2003; Rønning 1972; Horne 1947).
The investment policy of the savings banks followed two main patterns, referred
to as the Continental and Atlantic models. The Continental model canalised the
captured savings into local loans while the Atlantic model canalised the funds into
public bonds only (Pampillon 2003). The models used by different European
countries are presented in Table 1. The Continental model is divided into two parts:
Table 1 Savings banks models
in different European countries
(adapted from Pampillon 2003)
Atlantic Continental
Guaranteed Pure
United Kingdom Germany (municipality) Germany (private)
Belgium Austria (municipality) Austria (private)
Ireland Denmark (municipality) Denmark (private)
France Spain
Portugal Finland
Luxemburg Holland
Greece Italy
Portugal
Sweden
Norway
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the guaranteed model and the pure model whereas in the first a public entity
(normally the local municipality) guarantees the deposits while the second does not
contain a public guarantee scheme.
Savings banks have been criticised for their claim that they successfully reached
the poorest members of the community (Fa¨lting et al. 2006; Ograda 2003; Rønning
1972). For example, Fishlow (1961) presents evidence that, in some of the UK
savings banks in 1830, only 11.2% of the deposits were made to accounts of less
than £20, which represented nearly 1 year’s wage for a manufacturing operative or
agricultural labourer. However, (Horne 1947) argues that most of the customers in
England belonged to the poorer classes, and for Germany, Guinnane (2002) claims
that savings banks were able to fulfil their mission to reach the poorer classes
relatively well, which ran parallel to serving the middle class. In Scandinavia the
banks attracted deposits from both the poor and the not so poor and rapidly
penetrated society. In 1884, 18.8% of the Norwegian population, 19.8% of the
Swedish population, and 32.3% of the Danish population had their own account in a
savings bank (Egge 1972).
In the banks where deposits were recycled into loans, emphasis was placed upon
safety. Most of the initial lending was supplied to relatively wealthy borrowers who
could offer formal collateral (Fa¨lting et al. 2006; Rønning 1972; Clemmensen 1985;
Vittas 1997). Over time, lending was gradually extended to include mortgages, as
well as farming and manufacturing loans to less wealthy customers (Fa¨lting et al.
2006; Guinnane 2002).
Altogether it seems clear that in most savings banks the poor were served
alongside the not so poor. Thus, instead of arguing that the inclusion of wealthier
customers led to a drift away from the savings banks’ mission, one can argue that
such a policy of inclusion was required for savings banks to survive as a financial
system. Through the inclusion of wealthier customers, the savings banks managed
to increase their assets, thereby improving their operational costs and enabling their
long-term sustainability. Besides, loans funded by deposits of the poor were more
secure in the hands of those who could offer formal collateral.
2.1 Comparing the historic savings banks with today’s non-profit MFIs
The brief description of the origins of the savings banks invites a comparison with
today’s non-profit MFIs. First, both types of organisations have a mission to fight
poverty, operating as non-profits without any legal owners. As with savings banks,
the doctrine behind MFIs is self-help, and the promoters are people outside the
target population. However, while the savings banks were promoted by the local
elite, non-profit MFIs are mainly promoted by international donor organizations
(C-GAP 2006; Helms 2006).
A major difference between the organisations is that savings banks focused on
savings, whereas most non-profit MFIs focus on credit. Thus, capital for on-lending
stems from local depositors in savings banks, while it stems from international
donors and lenders in non-profit MFIs. The lack of savings mobilisation and the
dependency upon outside funding has long been a major concern in microfinance
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(Helms 2006), and the current international financial crisis has revived the debate.1
MFIs struggle to reach the poorest customers (Helms 2006). Yet, compared to
savings banks, they have been more successful in issuing credit to the target
population. The level of financial sustainability in savings banks was high due to the
low cost of operations. However, many MFIs struggle to become financially
sustainable. A recent survey of 704 MFIs by the Microbanking Bulletin (2007)
reveals that 41% are not financially self-sustainable. Table 2 summarises the main
similarities and differences between the two types of organisations.
3 Corporate governance literature and theory
There have been two recent, rigorous studies on corporate governance in relation to
MFIs. Hartarska (2005) uses different datasets spanning 46–144 observations from
East European MFIs, while Mersland and Strøm (2009) use a global dataset
including 278 rated MFIs from 60 countries. These studies explore the effect of
traditional governance mechanisms such as board composition and size, managerial
incentives, ownership type, and regulation. However, consistency in findings within
and across studies is rare. Both studies struggle to identify significant governance
influence. For example, consider the results from Mersland and Strøm (2009)
presented in Table 3.
As indicated in Table 3, Mersland and Strøm (2009) find that a female CEO and
an internal auditor reporting to the board is associated with better financial
performance, while international directors on the board increase costs and reduce
operational self-sufficiency. Other governance variables are insignificant or
Table 2 Comparison between the savings banks and non-profit MFIs
Issue Savings banks Non-profit MFIs
Mission To fight poverty To fight poverty
Doctrine Self-help Self-help
Promoters Local individual philanthropists International donors
Type of ownership Non-profit Non-profit
Dependence on subsidies Low, but some High, but decreasing
Level of sustainability High Low/medium, but improving
Financial service in focus Savings first and credit later Credit only due to regulation
Capital for on-lending From local depositors From international donors and lenders
Success in reaching
the poorest
Questioned in credit delivery.
Relatively good in savings
Relatively good, but do not reach
the very poorest
1 Currently (November 2008) the effect of the credit crunch and the international financial crisis on
microfinance is being heavily debated (for example at the European Microfinance Week, 12–14
November, 2008 in Luxembourg). Preliminary conclusions seem to be that the crisis may actually
increase the demand for microfinance services as wage earners will be pushed into self-employment.
However, the crisis may hit hard those MFIs that depend on international funding, thus the importance of
being funded locally and with deposits will be revived.
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inconsistent. Hartarska (2005) finds strong support for independent boards with
limited employee participation. None of the variables significant in the two studies
are explored in both.
The non-findings in the two studies are actually the most interesting. For
example, both Hartarska (2005) and Mersland and Strøm (2009) find that neither
regulation, nor a for-profit ownership structure advance MFIs’ performance.
Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) confirm the finding that regulation has no effect,
while Mersland and Strøm (2008) confirm that ownership of MFIs does not matter.
Both Hartarska (2005) and Mersland and Strøm (2009) conclude that governance
matters, but the traditional governance mechanisms seem to matter less in MFIs
relative to firms in mature markets. They call for better data and the study of
alternative governance mechanisms in order to better understand the effect of
corporate governance in the microfinance industry.
Contrary to the findings in Hartarska (2005) and Mersland and Strøm (2009), the
practitioner-oriented literature on governance in MFIs emphasises traditional,
vertical governance, like the composition and role of boards (Rock et al. 1998;
Otero and Chu 2002). This body of literature also emphasises a need to transform
from non-profit to for-profit ownership (Ledgerwood and White 2006). The
practitioner literature generally follows the logic of agency theory, where the aim is
to reduce agency costs stemming from vertical relationships between owners and
Table 3 The effect of corporate governance on the financial performance of MFIs
ROA OSS PY OC
Constant -0.418** -0.411 -0.104** 1.140**
CEO/chairman duality -0.032 -0.154 0.118** 0.074
International directors -0.010 -0.095** 0.010 0.037**
Internal board auditor 0.022 0.133* -0.034 -0.018
Board size -0.001 -0.005 -0.001 0.001
Share holder ownership -0.012 -0.129 -0.011 0.027
Female CEO 0.053** 0.215** 0.059 -0.036
Individual loan methodology 0.034 0.014 -0.026 -0.039
Competition index 0.011 -0.011 0.022* 0.004
Bank regulation 0.005 0.056 0.019 0.015
Urban market 0.001 0.090 0.066* 0.044
MFI experience 0.000 -0.010** -0.002 -0.003
Portfolio at risk (30) -0.085 0.436** -0.132* -0.131**
Firm size 0.026** 0.119** 0.006 -0.078**
Human dev. index -0.100 -0.194 0.279 0.413**
Wald F (sign.) 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
Firm years 342 303 343 352
Results from Mersland and Strøm (2009), Table 5
Return on assets (ROA), operational self-sufficiency (OSS), portfolio yield (PY), and operational costs
(OC) explained by board characteristics, internal and external governance mechanisms, and firm and
economy characteristics. Random effects panel data 3SLS estimation spanning the period 1998–2007
Significant results at the 5% (10%) level are marked with ** (*)
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management (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983). MFIs are
recommended to set up governance systems in order to mitigate agency costs by
aligning top management with owners’ goals and putting controls into place (Rock
et al. 1998; Otero and Chu 2002; Helms 2006). Despite the fact that Hartarska
(2005) and Mersland and Strøm (2009) do not find empirical support for the effect
of these recommendations, they are not necessarily wrong. However, they do not
sufficiently account for the fact that most MFIs do not intend to be shareholder
owned, have multiple goals, and do not have an inherent profit motive. Moreover,
MFIs differ from regular firms in that they encounter horizontal agency problems
between the bank and its customers (Adams and Mehran 2003), and donor-funded
MFIs face agency costs in their relationships with donors.
Thomsen (2008) and Hansmann (1996) suggest that the importance of owners
monitoring management has been overstated. The degree of product market
competition and customer-firm relationships seems to discipline managers more
effectively than owners (Hansmann 1996). The problem is exacerbated in
microfinance, since the customer has little or no collateral or credit history, low
education level, and little knowledge of the MFI. Moreover, the regulatory ability of
local regimes is generally low. Under such conditions, issues such as closeness to
the customer and mutual trust are paramount. There is thus a need for a broader set
of governance mechanisms that account for agency costs stemming from multiple
stakeholders.
Stakeholder theorists widen the approach of agency costs in arguing that, in
addition to responding to owners’ interests, manager must balance the needs of
several stakeholders, such as employees, customers, local communities, authorities
and debt holders (Freeman 1984; Mitchell et al. 1997). For the non-profit MFIs as
for the savings banks, stakeholder theory helps establish a broader understanding
and identifies who and what counts in the governance of these organisations
(Mersland 2009).
4 Governance mechanisms in the savings banks and the MFIs
This section uses theory to identify and understand corporate governance
mechanisms in pro-poor banking. For each mechanism identified, the historical
literature on savings banks is studied in order to analyse its effect upon governance.
The analysis of each mechanism is concluded by assessing whether it has affect in
the governance of non-profit MFIs today. The mechanisms covered were identified
through a review of the historic savings banks literature and are comprised of the
following: the organisation’s mission, boards, donors, public regulation, apex
associations, market competition, maturity mismatches in liabilities/assets, and the
influence of local communities and governments.
4.1 The mission of the organisation
Non-profit organisations do not have owners and are accountable to their missions
(Hansmann 1996). Stakeholders influence a non-profit organisation’s mission and
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monitor its fulfilment. The stakeholders with the most bargaining power are those
with the most influence over the organisation’s mission. A clearly defined and well-
informed mission reduces the cost of disagreements and bargaining between
stakeholders (Speckbacher 2008).
4.1.1 The mission in the savings banks
A striking feature in the history of savings banks is the ability of the banks to change
their mission at an early stage of development. Vittas (1997) explains how savings
banks were created to serve the poor through saving services, but they quickly
reoriented their services to include the middle class and facilitated credit when
legislation allowed. However, most banks continued to serve the poor, expanding
their mission rather than departing from it. This shift made savings banks more
financially sustainable, and at the same time it helped them reach out to larger
markets. Altogether the banks went through a process of reorientation. In the
beginning, there was the belief that savings and thrift could eliminate poverty and
that the poor would be easily recruited. This enthusiastic phase was soon replaced
by a more realistic understanding of the possibilities. Many of the poor were not
able or willing to save and handling only small customers led to high operational
costs. Loans were issued to wealthier clients in order to be secured. There was no
lack of critical voices as the savings banks expanded their mission, but the
pragmatic approach was approved by all surviving banks.
4.1.2 Mission in the MFIs
As with the savings banks, modern microfinance experienced an enthusiastic first
stage, culminating in the Nobel Peace Prize being awarded to Mohammad Yunus
and Grameen Bank in 2006. However, insiders in the industry have long been aware
of the limitations (Dichter and Harper 2007). Reaching the poorest is a struggle, and
the impact from access to services is often low, especially for those with limited
access to assets, knowledge, and networks before contracting loans (Hulme 2000).
Some MFIs are comfortably serving some wealthier clients alongside the poor, but
as a whole the industry has still not reached the pragmatic stage and the mission
drift debate remain lively (Morduch 2000).
4.2 Boards
Boards are a generic corporate governance mechanism to minimise agency costs
stemming from the separation of owners/donors and management (Fama and Jensen
1983). Boards monitor, replace management, ratify major decisions, and bring in
important networks and knowledge. Well-functioning boards ought to reduce
agency costs and enhance organisational performance. However, the empirical
evidence from for-profit firms indicates that, on average, boards matter little
(Thomsen 2008). Speckbacher (2008) argues that, since non-profit organisations
lack owners, their boards play a more important role than those of for-profit firms.
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Board members of non-profit organisations offer their reputation as collateral to the
public and try to minimise the risk of losing it (Handy 1995).
4.2.1 Boards in the savings banks
Since the origin of savings banks, boards have overseen their operations (Teck
1968; Fishlow 1961; Rønning 1972). Initially, board members would not have any
direct or indirect business relationship with the bank, implying full independence.
Later, however, it became normal in some banks to provide loans to board or
founding members, and their children and servants were often depositors (Horne
1947; Rønning 1972). A board position was fully voluntary, and the boards were
formed by the upper class including pastors and teachers (Fishlow 1961; Fa¨lting
et al. 2006; Rønning 1972; Ograda 2003; Horne 1947). As time went by, the
bourgeoisie were gradually replaced by professionals, such as lawyers, accountants,
and business managers (Clemmensen 1985; Rønning 1972). During the initial years,
the participation of the target group, the poor, in the board was unthinkable.
As the savings banks started serving also less poor customers, some banks
struggled to maintain the interest of their initial philanthropic founders (Rønning
1972). This is illustrated in the first annual report of the Cork Saving Banks in
Ireland (founded in 1817):
this species of deposits [high amounts], if continued, could eventually close
the Bank, as no gentleman could be got to give their time gratuitously as
mangers to conduct the money dealing of their equals and in many cases their
superiors in rank and property (cited in Ograda 2003, p. 35).
However, even if the savings banks struggled to maintain the interest of their
board members and gradually became more and more management dominated, it
seems likely that they indirectly continued to provide some basic monitoring in
order to protect their own reputation. Moreover, it seems likely that the banks
capitalised upon the reputation of their founders. Gradually other stakeholders, like
representatives from local governments and later customers and employees, were
invited on the boards (Fa¨lting et al. 2006; Guinnane 2002).
4.2.2 Boards in MFIs
MFIs today follow a traditional separation of management and board. Board
members of non-profit MFIs are generally upper- or middle-class professionals.
Similar to the savings banks, many MFIs struggle to identify board members with an
appropriate background who are able and willing to dedicate the time that effective
monitoring requires (Labie 2001). Stakeholders like donors, customers, employees,
and debt holders are generally absent from MFI boards (Mersland and Strøm 2009).
4.3 Donors
Donors monitor organizations to verify that their donations are used in accordance
with their wishes (Fama and Jensen 1983). When donors are individuals, they have a
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direct agency relationship with the firm. However, when donors are organisations
funded by back-donors or taxpayers, the firm is monitored by an agent rather than a
principal (Varian 1990).
4.3.1 Donors to the savings banks
Savings banks were founded by wealthy philanthropists who donated initial capital.
However, this initial capital was rarely substantial (Hansmann 1996). Still, donor
involvement was important, and they often took seats on the board. The monitoring
they offered, the social capital, and their reputations were more important than their
financial capital (Fa¨lting et al. 2006). Donations were largely confined to the
formation of the banks. After their establishment, the banks were fully dependent
upon operational income and voluntary work (Hansmann 1996). After their initial
donations, the donors contributed knowledge, reputation, and governance, but
generally not additional funding.
4.3.2 Donors to the MFIs
While non-profit ownership of the savings banks was chosen in order to protect
customers (Hansmann 1996), most MFIs seem to have chosen non-profit ownership
as a means to tap into donors’ pockets (Mersland 2009). The term ‘briefcase NGO,’
referring to organisations formed by private individuals, is well-known. The term
also indicates that several donors practice slack control, permitting personal benefits
to individuals.
Donors play a major role in the microfinance industry (C-GAP 2006). Donations
stem from international NGOs and the bilateral and multilateral donor communities.
These organisations are funded by back-donors, either private philanthropists or
taxpayers. Therefore, MFIs face the governance challenge that managers serving as
agents are supervised by donors, who also serve as agents (Varian 1990). This
structure differs from that of savings banks, where the donors of initial capital were
private individuals who often took a board position in addition. In contrast, few
donors take board seats in MFIs (Mersland and Strøm 2009).
4.4 Regulation
Bank regulation has the potential to seriously affect the performance of a bank or an
MFI. However, developing economies suffer from very weak institutional frame-
works, imperfect markets, and incomplete information. Weak regulatory ability is a
major reason for the existence of non-profit organisations. While privately-owned
banks have strong incentives to invest in risky projects, a non-profit bank is less likely
to employ depositors’ money in risky endeavours (Hansmann 1996).
4.4.1 Regulation in the savings banks
Except that some countries obliged the savings banks to invest in public bonds, the
banks were generally unregulated or operated under a friendly regulatory regime.
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The necessary trust was generated not by law, but by the reputation offered by the
local elite who actively promoted the banks. Where regulation was introduced the
objective was often to let the banks adhere to a few basic rules to insure that
operations were concentrated on non-wealthy customers (Guinnane 2002). In other
countries the main purpose of regulation was to allow the banks subsidised interest
on public bonds or to exempt them from stamp duties (Fishlow 1961; Rønning
1972).
However, as the level of savings grew and investment in less secure assets
became more common, legislators gradually responded with additional regulation
(Fa¨lting et al. 2006; Rønning 1972). Yet the regulatory framework installed was
friendly, intended to strengthen public confidence in banks. However, in some
countries, like Spain and Denmark, where regulation was introduced as a means to
enhance public trust, the result was often the opposite leading to withdrawal of
deposits (Martinez 1998) or lowered expansion (Hansen 2001).
4.4.2 Regulation of MFIs
Many have issued calls for more prudent regulation of MFIs (Christen et al. 2003).
Non-profit MFIs are generally unregulated and not allowed to intermediate deposits.
The main argument is that, since non-profit organisations do not have owners with
monitoring incentives, they are weaker and riskier (Jansson et al. 2004). As a
consequence, non-profit MFIs are prompted to transform themselves into share-
holder banks in order to become regulated. However, Mersland and Strøm (2008)
find that ownership type doesn’t matter for MFI performance, and Hartarska and
Nadolnyak (2007) and Mersland and Strøm (2009) find that regulation has no direct
effect upon MFI performance, and can only indirectly help increase scale and scope
if the MFI is allowed to mobilise deposits (Hartarska and Nadolnyak 2007).
4.5 Apex associations
Moore and Stewart (1998) suggest that the use of collective self-regulation can help
remedy agency costs in non-profits. National and voluntary associations of non-
profits can improve managerial practices and organisational performance through
self-policing. Since non-profit organisations lack owners with strong monitoring
incentives, Speckbacher (2008) argues that they are in special need of external
reporting systems in order to reduce informational asymmetry between management
and the various stakeholders. Such external reporting systems can be organised
through auditing or self-regulation apex systems.
4.5.1 Apex associations in the savings banks
National apex associations were important in the early savings banks. The aim was
typically threefold: first, to increase the overall power of negotiation with authorities
and commercial competitors; second, to help the banks achieve economies of scale
in service provisions (e.g. money transfer systems across the savings banks); and
third, to act as a bank for the banks (Comin and Torres 2003; Guinnane 2002). In
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order to uphold membership in the association, minimum performance standards
and self-regulation by the apex were common. Seibel (2003) points out that
effective auditing carried out by the apex associations was an important mechanism
in savings bank governance.
4.5.2 Apex associations among MFIs
Apex associations among MFIs are common (SEEP Network 2005). They play a
representative role and to some degree, they are also active in building the
professional capacity of their members. In some networks, such as Red Financiera
Rural in Ecuador and FINRURAL in Bolivia, they have installed a self-reporting
monitoring system, though formal types of self-regulation are uncommon. The
argument is that self-regulation cannot be prudent, as free riders are an obvious
problem (Christen et al. 2003). Also, the networks of MFIs seldom serve their
members with tangible services like wholesale lending, IT, or giro systems. As a
consequence, the network becomes less important in the governance of the MFIs
relative to the governance role of the savings bank associations.
4.6 Competition
Market competition is an external governance mechanism. In general, the more
intense the competition, the less the owners need internal governance mechanisms
(Schmidt 1997; Hart 1983). Hansmann (1996) argues that, in markets with
trustworthy regulation and deposit insurance, ownerless savings banks can compete
with their commercial peers due to the disciplinary effect of market competition.
4.6.1 Competition in savings banks
In their early years, savings banks did not encounter much competition. People in
urban areas did not trust the commercial banks, and local savings banks were
generally alone in offering banking services in rural areas. However, gradually more
savings banks were established, implying greater competition (Clemmensen 1985),
and more trustworthy regulation of commercial banks made them an alternative for
poorer customers (Hansmann 1989). Furthermore, since the mid-nineteenth century,
member-based savings and credit cooperatives in many countries became important
competitors of savings banks (Wolff 1919; Hansmann 1996). Today, several
observers argue that market competition is probably the number one mechanism
enabling savings banks to continue as competitive organisations (Crespi et al. 2004;
Altunbas et al. 2001).
4.6.2 Competition in today’s microfinance markets
Many microfinance markets, especially those in rural locations, still have no formal
financial service supplier (Robinson 2001; Christen et al. 2004). Where MFIs exist,
markets are often characterised by a severe lack of competition, and most clients
have limited bargaining power vis-a`-vis microfinance providers. However, there are
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exceptions. In Bolivia, where competition has been increasing, the average annual
yield has decreased during the last decade, from 50% in the leading MFIs to just
above 20% (Porteous 2006).
4.7 Demand deposits
Most savings in banks are in accounts where the depositor can withdraw money on
demand. Most theoretical models assume that the role of such demandable debt is to
provide flexibility to the depositors (Freixas and Rochet 1997). Calomiris and Kahn
(1991) offer an alternative explanation. They point out that allowing on-demand
withdrawals implies a mismatch between the maturity of assets and liabilities. Such
a financial structure is an optimal instrument for management control. In the event
of bank trouble, depositors can immediately withdraw their money, causing the
bank to fall. Calomiris and Kahn (1991) further point out that the disciplining
mechanism works as long as the maturity of liabilities is less than the maturity of
assets. Hollis and Sweetman (2007) tested Calomiris and Kahn’s (1991) theory on
an historic case from Ireland. They found that institutions with more deposits were
better at controlling expenses than those with less funding stemming from deposits.
4.7.1 Demandable debt in savings banks
Historians have long recognised the importance of demandable debt in disciplining
managers of savings banks:
if the saver had any dissatisfaction with the way the organization was being
managed, he simply terminated his relationship by withdrawing his funds
(Teck 1968, p. 33).
This is recognised by Hollis and Sweetman (1998), who point out that the
importance of depositor monitoring on the sustainability of pro-poor banks should
not be underestimated.
4.7.2 Savings in MFIs
Non-profit MFIs are generally not allowed to intermediate deposits and conse-
quently excluded from offering savings and funding their portfolios locally. Instead
non-profit MFIs are funded by donations and medium-term international debt. Thus,
since micro-credit is lent on short terms, the maturity of MFIs’ debt generally
exceeds that of their assets. As a result, non-profit MFIs lack the disciplinary effect
stemming from monitoring by depositors or debt holders.
4.8 Local governments and communities
From a stakeholder’s perspective, local governments and communities have
important influence on the firm’s opportunities and behaviour.
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4.8.1 Local government and community influence on savings banks
Savings banks have always been tied to and promoted by local communities in
general, and by the local authorities in particular. In most countries, the local
authorities helped organise the banks, and they have often provided some of the
initial capital. In several local communities, the first savings banks merged with
existing social services. In Spain, the banks joined forces with the Montes de
Piedad, a relief fund for the poor (Sanchez 2003). In Norway, several savings banks
were merged with the community corn chambers intended for lean years (Rønning
1972). At the same time, however, it was important for the banks to remain private
entities, rather than public. Hence, the local authority was only one stakeholder
alongside others, and attempts to tie the banks more closely to the public sector were
punished by massive withdrawals of deposits (Martinez 1998).
Another feature tying savings banks to local communities has been the banks’
funding of charity work and community projects (Sanchez 2003). Institutionalising the
partial return of profits to local communities has created a mechanism by which the
local community helps to steward the banks. In addition, similar to dividends of for-
profit firms, the funding of local projects reduces the bank’s free cash flow and
management’s power, creating a governance mechanism (Jensen and Meckling 1976).
4.8.2 Local government and community influence on MFIs today
Today, few MFIs relate closely to the local authorities. The local authorities are
more often seen as obstacles, creating difficulties in issuing permits or imposing
taxes. In Peru, however, the Cajas Municipales represent an interesting exception.
Over the last couple of decades, most of the Cajas have been successful MFIs
(rating reports available at www.ratingfund.org).
In their contact with local communities, except the member based organizations,
most MFIs enter into a traditional bank-customer contractual relationship. The
community is seldom a driving force behind the establishment of a non-profit MFI,
nor is it invited to take a more active stake in its governance. However, there are
exceptions. In the Bolivian non-profit MFI Diaconia FRIF, they have a conscious
strategy of being part of the Indian Aymara community. The staff is largely Aymara,
and several of them are involved in different Aymara organisations. According to
Diaconia FRIF, the close relationship with the Aymara community has been
instrumental in securing its success.
5 Discussion
The differences in governance mechanisms between the historic savings banks and
today’s non-profit MFIs invite deeper discussion. The previous section is
summarised in Table 4.
One of the most puzzling questions is why the non-profit ownership structure of
savings banks was seen as a guarantee for avoiding excessively risky behaviour,
whereas it is considered inappropriate and excessively risky today (Jansson et al.
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2004). Hansmann (1996) argues that since savings banks face a non-distribution
constraint, they are generally more trustworthy than for-profit banks. Part of the
answer is likely found in the fact that many non-profit MFIs today have simply
become ‘briefcases’ of their founders or managers. Another part may be that donors
today are often too generous in their funding and too slack in their monitoring. The
lack of a broader understanding of governance in general, and of non-profit
ownership in particular, is also important.
It is a fact that the microfinance industry has many well-performing non-profit
MFIs, demonstrating that non-profit ownership does not necessarily imply slack
performance and donor dependence (Mersland and Strøm 2008). However, since the
current credit crunch is assumed to hit non-deposit taking MFIs relatively harder, it
may become increasingly important to establish regulatory frameworks allowing
well performing non-profit MFIs to intermediate deposits. Governance lessons from
Table 4 The governance mechanisms of the historic savings banks and today’s non-profit MFIs
Governance
mechanism
Historic savings banks Today’s non-profit MFIs
Mission Pragmatic willingness to broaden the
mission and include wealthier
clients
Mission drift debate still ongoing
Boards Composed of upper-class people who
also took part in the management.
Gradually the board became less
important
Composed of upper-/middle-class
professionals. Are considered
important, but still most MFIs
struggle to have active and
competent boards
Donors Took an active role in governance
through board seats and personal
reputation
Monitoring efforts vary, but few
donors are willing to take on an
active governance role or sit on
boards
Regulation Either unregulated or operated under
friendly regulatory regimes
Unregulated because of non-profit
ownership.
Apex associations Were important in monitoring the
banks and were a self-regulation
mechanism. Also provided
important services
Important, but still much less than in
the savings banks. Do not provide
much self-regulation and tangible
services
Competition Low or no competition in the
beginning, but today this is
considered to be the number-one
governance mechanism
Still low competition, but increasing.
Mismatch in
liability/asset
maturity
Mismatch in liability/asset maturity
important in disciplining the
managers
Non-existent due to the regulatory
regimes
Local
communities
and authorities
Were important stakeholders in the
banks and took active part in their
governance
The interaction with local authorities
is generally low and the
relationship with the communities
is normally only of the customer-
firm contract type
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the savings banks may turn out to be particularly relevant. In this regard the recent
initiatives in Bolivia are interesting, where non-profit MFIs, members of the apex
FINRURAL, are about to become regulated and allowed to intermediate deposits.
The survival of savings banks can be attributed to pragmatism and their
willingness to expand their missions. Several of the most commercial MFIs today
will probably argue that this has also enabled their viability. Some, such as Procredit
in Bolivia, provide loans above US$100,000 and are criticised by some for having
left their original mission behind. However, Procredit states the opposite: most of
their customers take very small loans, implying that they have expanded their
mission but not abandoned it. However, few MFIs are as pragmatic as Procredit.
The lesson from savings banks is that MFIs may need to become more pragmatic in
order to survive over the longer term.
This study reveals that there is clearly much more to governance than boards. Of
course boards are important for MFIs today as they were in the initial stage of savings
banks, but other mechanisms must substitute and reinforce boards in the disciplining
of managers. Upper class board members in the savings banks were gradually replaced
by groups with a more direct stake in the banks. Whether the inclusion of stakeholders
like customers, employers, local communities, donors and debt holders could enhance
the performance of non-profit MFIs should be subject for research efforts.
The Calomiris and Kahn’s (1991) model is important for understanding how
agency costs in banking can be reduced. This is particularly true when there is no
takeover market (a non-profit organisation cannot be taken over) and in an
unregulated environment where the public has little confidence in the regulator’s
willingness and ability to closely monitor the bank. However, it may sound too risky
to introduce deposit intermediation in MFIs as a means to discipline managers
through monitoring by depositors. And, of course, this would not be without any kind
of pre-screening and monitoring of MFIs. However, microfinance customers operate
in an informal economy, where they are already well acquainted with the need to
monitor their deposits in informal rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs;
Bouman 1995) or pre-payments made to the local construction shops. They are also
well aware of the risks involved. For example, a study in Uganda revealed that 99% of
the participants in ROSCAs had experienced losses (Wright and Mutesasira 2001).
Still, poor people prefer these schemes because the alternative of keeping cash at
home is worse due to countless claims and needs (Rutherford 2000). Thus, the
alternative of allowing well-performing non-profit MFIs to offer deposit services, and
thereby introducing a new stakeholder to monitor operations, sounds like a solid bet.
Furthermore, savings banks offer historical evidence that it might work.
The lessons from savings banks present a message for donors. Their role is not
only to donate, but to monitor. Donors generally avoid board seats in MFIs,
probably due to the culture of the donors, who generally play the role of supporting
local civil society rather than being part of it. However, MFIs are not advocacy
organisations fighting for people’s rights. They are banks, and those who provide
them with funds should monitor their operations. Moreover, dedicated donors risk
their reputation. Unfortunately, microfinance donors are organisations acting on
behalf of back-donors and taxpayers, which makes fleeing from difficulties easier.
The governance of non-profit micro finance institutions 343
123
Though Mersland and Strøm (2009) could not confirm the governance effect of
competition, the evidence from savings banks suggests that competition does
discipline managers. We expect that as markets mature increased competition will
bring along customer benefits as experienced in Bolivia. Besides, policy makers and
regulators should not forget the fact that multiple types of providers offer additional
customer benefits compared to a single type of bank. Guinnane (2002) points out
that historically diversity in the type of banks was important in generating a type of
competition that fostered sound management. In addition, Normark (1996) points
out that a combination of organisational types operating in the same market
enhances competition and customer benefits. Thus, differences in missions and
ownership structures stimulate competition and drive the actors towards different
market segments (Mersland 2009). However, this requires a supportive regulatory
environment across organisational types.
An interesting aspect of the historic savings banks is their close relationship with
local governments. Whether such a relationship would be positive in today’s
politicised environment is uncertain. This should be a subject of further research
effort, as should MFIs’ ties to local communities. Will the geographical expansion
observed in many MFIs be beneficial in the long run? Would they be better off with
a more integrated relationship with major stakeholders in a more limited local
community where monitoring is more likely?
Apex bank associations were instrumental in both governing the savings banks
through self-regulatory efforts and improving economies of scope through service
provision. Even today, spin-off companies, such as giro centrals or investment
funds, are important apex structures, providing important services to savings banks.
For the MFIs, starting off with better self-regulation efforts, as they have done in
Bolivia and Ecuador, could be a natural first step. Self-regulation cannot be a full
substitute for prudent regulation by banking authorities, but it will be an extra
mechanism playing a role in the overall governance system of MFIs. Besides this,
independent MFIs will need to devise strategies to enable better economies of scope
(e.g. IT systems). Thus, in the years to come, apex associations could probably play
an increasingly important role, just as they did and continue to do for savings banks.
6 Conclusion
Microfinance is high on the public agenda. Better corporate governance of MFIs has
been identified as a key to enhancing the viability of the industry. However, the recent
literature on the subject has struggled to identify the corporate governance
mechanisms influencing the performance of MFIs (Mersland and Strøm 2009,
Hartarska 2005). In line with recommendations provided in Mersland (2009), this
paper uses a historical parallel found in savings banks to present corporate governance
lessons for today’s MFIs. There are several similarities between nineteenth century
savings banks and today’s non-profit MFIs. Both legally and economically, due to
their non-profit status and non-distribution constraints, they are similar types of
organisations. The corporate governance mechanisms affecting one type of organi-
sation may therefore affect the other. Guided by stakeholder and agency theories, this
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paper reviews the historical literature on the subject to identify the important
governance mechanisms that allowed savings banks to survive, and it analyses
whether MFIs, particularly non-profit MFIs, can learn something from their example.
The findings indicate that monitoring by bank associations, depositors, donors,
and local communities were important in disciplining managers and securing the
survival of savings banks. External governance in the form of public regulation was
generally absent, while product market competition became an increasingly major
factor in disciplining the managers. The willingness to expand their mission to serve
wealthier customers alongside the poor helped the banks to become financially
viable.
This paper demonstrates that historical studies can lend governance lessons
today. The findings could prompt a revision in the thought surrounding microfinance
governance, which stresses for-profit ownership, regulation, and traditional vertical
board control. The lessons from savings banks indicate that a broader and more
stakeholder-based understanding of corporate governance is necessary. Stakeholders
like depositors, donors, local communities, and bank associations can together
provide a monitoring system that can enhance the long-term survival of MFIs. The
findings also indicate that the need to transform ownership and limit regulation to
for-profit MFIs could be mitigated, and a pragmatic attitude toward financial
objectives may improve the financial viability of the MFIs.
The importance placed on microfinance as a development instrument, combined
with the increasing inflow of capital to the industry, indicate a need to better
understand governance systems for MFIs. Further studies are needed. In particular,
future research could consider how a combination of organisational types enhances
competition in the microfinance market and how competition affects MFIs’
performance. Studies are also needed on how donor monitoring, apex organizations,
and mismatches in the maturity of liabilities and assets influence management
behaviour and MFI performance. A historical study, similar to this, on how member
based cooperative MFIs can learn governance lessons from their nineteenth century
cooperative peers (Wolff 1919), is also recommended.
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